Abstract. Information security is an important and growing need. The most common schemes used for detection systems include pattern-or signature-based and anomaly-based. Anomaly-based schemes use a set of metrics, which outline the normal system behavior and any significant deviation from the established profile will be treated as an anomaly. 
Introduction
Security threats to computer systems include virus, denials of service, vulnerability break-ins, etc. These threats have increased immensely in the last few years. While many security mechanisms have been introduced to undermine those threats, none can completely prevent all of them. Security threats to the computer systems have raised the importance of anomaly detection [1] . Anomaly detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of anomaly. An anomaly appears as a symptom of an attempt to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass any security mechanism of a computer or network.
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are based on a probabilistic finite state machine used to model stochastic sequences [2] . HMMs have many applications in signal processing, pattern recognition, speech and gesture recognition, as well as applications to anomaly detection. In an HMM, the estimation of good model parameters affects the performance of the recognition or detection processes [3] . The HMM parameters can be determined during an iterative process called "training". The Baum-Welch algorithm [4] is one method applied in setting an HMM's parameters, but this method has a drawback: being a gradient-based method, it may converge to a local optimum.
Global search techniques can be used to optimize an HMM's parameters. Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Evolutionary Programming (EP) are global optimization techniques that can be used to optimize an HMM's parameters [3] . Studies of using GA to train HMMs are relatively rare, particularly in comparison with the large literature on applying GA to neural network training [2] .
In the study presented in this paper we want to know (given certain events or behaviors of the study objects), what is expected or what can be anticipated as output. That is, we are interested in studying the behavior of a set of random variables over time, working with stochastic processes. In other words, given the behavior of a computer network, the problem is to automatically develop an HMM capable of discerning between normal and anomalous behavior. This task will be accomplished using Evolutionary Computation. In this paper we present the use of EP for the creation and optimization of an HMM; the ideas presented in this paper have been implemented in a framework called EvoHMM (Evolution of Hidden Markov Models). EvoHMM takes one or more time series as input data and produces a trained HMM, without any human intervention. The produced HMM is used for anomaly detection in computer network traffic.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces some basic concepts on HMM theory. Section 3 presents related work on using HMM in anomaly detection. Section 4 describes Discrete and Continuous HMMs. Section 5 deals with Evolutionary Programming. Section 6 defines the process known as Anomaly Detection. Section 7 presents the results of our proposal, compared to models produced using the Baum-Welch algorithm and against HMMs created by a human expert. Finally, Section 8 presents our conclusions and mentions possibilities for future work.
Hidden Markov Models
HMMs are derived from Markov processes and Markov chains, which are stochastic processes. Processes can be viewed as a series of events, in which the probability of an event depends on the event immediately preceding it [32, 33] . An HMM is a double stochastic process, where one of them is an underlying, not observable process. The second process can only be observed through another set of stochastic processes that produce the sequence of observed symbols.
The most common application of HMMs is in automatic speech recognition, where HMMs were used to characterize the statistical properties of a signal [4, 34] .
The study by Nicholl et al. [35] refers to HMMs and the various adaptations that have been used in areas other than speech recognition. Examples of their application are in recognition of faces, images, video, and manuscripts. Variants and extensions of HMMs include econometrics, time series, and signal processing [36] .
An HMM consists of a finite number of states connected by transitions. observations, where the generated sequence depends on the likelihood of starting on different initial states and its transitions [4] .
An HMM is thus represented by three sets of probabilities [35] , as defined by where A = {a ij } is the state transition probability matrix, B = {b j (k)} is the emission probability matrix, indicating the probability of a specified symbol being emitted given a particular state, and Π = {π i } is the initial state probability distribution [34] .
In general, the research works presented in Section 3 are applied to stochastic processes (random variables) to produce models that allow us to make predictions about the future behavior of a process. That is, a succession of random variables which evolve as a function of another variable, usually time.
Related Work
Initially, most works on HMMs were designed to DNA sequences, speech recognition, and other fields. Currently, the work area of HMMs has expanded into a large field of action.
HMMs applied to Anomaly Detection
The use of HMMs applied to anomaly detection is relatively new, but there are some works related to this area. All works included in this section used HMMs and were designed and trained by experienced people in the area, that is, with a priori knowledge for proper performance. Most investigations are focused on discrete observations, and some of HMMs structures include two to five states only. The data used for training the HMMs is mainly based on system calls and a user behavior or profile. This section presents some research works on HMMs and its application to the security of computer systems.
• HMMs research works used on Intrusion Detection Systems. These research works are focused on detecting and preventing attacks. The main goal is to determine the probability of an attack by an intruder. Some works related to this are: Xiuqing et al. [5] , based on adaptative clustering, Dan et al. [6] present an intrusion detection system where based on system calls, Zihui et al. [7] is based on a set of data of system calls, Zeng et al. [13] worked on reduction of a set of observations, Li et al. [14] used a fuzzy approach, Lee et al. [20] perform Intrusion detection based on mobile agents, Zhicai et al. [10] present an approach based on the discrete steps of the attacker or malware, and Khanna et al. [22] work used functions of multigaussian mixture on sequences of observation.
• HMMs used on Anomaly Deteccion Systems. Some works are focused on detecting any anomaly and misuse in the behavior of systems. Work related to this are Xiuqing et al. [5] , based on adaptative clustering to detect anomalies, Ye et al. [8] based on defined times that messages take to travel between nodes, Wang et al. [9] based on system calls, Sugaya et al. [12] presents a detection scheme based on monitoring resources of a computer system, The work of Zhao et al. [15] is based on protocol interaction data to discern between normal and abnormal network traffic, Shivaraj et al. [16] used a statistical approach to detect unauthorized accesses, Yasami et al. [19] present an approach based on network traffic behavior of a host, Garcia et al. [21] worked on anomaly detection based on processor workload data, Jha et al. [24] created an algorithm based on system calls to discover anomalies, and Warrender et al. [25] based on sequences generated by system calls.
• HMMs used on Pattern Recognition. Some research works are focused on the creation and recognition of a model or pattern. In this category we can include sequence of DNA or protein alignment, as in the work presented by Zaki et al. [11] , the work of Li et al. [14] is based on pattern recognition using a fuzzy approach, Srivastava et al. [17] develop pattern-based models to detect anomalous credit cards transactions, and Singh et al. [18] created probabilistic models of patterns of people behavior, monitoring features of these people. There is also a research work that uses HMM, Brewer et al. [23] , on digital forensic analysis for suspected interactions.
In summary, we can say that, according to the state of the art in this area, we cannot present a fair comparison of EvoHMM against other systems, since all other research works build their HMM models based on experience and knowledge of the designer. Additionally, most of them use discrete values and take as reference a single variable in the observation sequence.
Parameters Optimization of an HMM
Methods used to determine the best parameters of an HMM include Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Evolutionary Programming (EP); finding optimal parameters of these HMMs is a challenge. Proper starting values of the parameters of an HMM, have a significant impact on model performance. The determination of the best parameters of an HMM is a difficult optimization problem, because HMMs described a double stochastic process [25] .
The systems described in this section generate HMMs automatically. An important characteristic in these works is that they use HMMs based on observation sequences of discrete values, oriented to sets of symbols or alphabets of small sizes (DNA sequences, some language or alphabets, etc). Furthermore, these models only observe a single value in an observation sequence.
• HMMs generated by GA for Speech Recognition. The following research works are focused on the speech recognition using HMMs, as in Oudelha et al. [26] combining the Baum-Welch algorithm (BW); in Cheshomi et al. [27] also uses the BW algorithm. Bhuriyakorn et al. [28] present approaches for HMMs topologies generation, in Yang et al. [29] address the optimization problem combining a Tabu search and BW algorithm; Yang et al. [30] uses Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and GA on recognition performance, and in Ogawa et al. [31] determine the structure of a Partly HMM with GA.
• There is a work of Won et al. [2] that presents the use of GA for evolving HMMs, used on information prediction of secondary structure for protein sequences.
While most work in GA focuses on determining the best parameters of an HMM, others once obtained the best parameters, concentrate on the use of HMM in the determination of protein or phoneme sequences. Most of HMMs used in anomaly detection, as described above, were designed with a priori knowledge of the models used. HMMs designed with a priori knowledge, implicitly involves probabilistic knowledge derived from previous experience to create models. That is, they require prior knowledge of data behavior and consideration of HMMs general theory. The work proposed in this paper combines two techniques: Evolutionary Programming for HMM design and parameters optimization, and the use of an HMM in anomaly detection. Once EvoHMM produces an HMM, the model is applied to anomaly detection. This approach allows any user to deploy the system without the assumption of prior knowledge in probability and HMM theory.
Discrete and Continuous HMMs
Real world processes produce sequences of observable symbols. These symbols may be discrete (e.g., the side of a coin, points on the face of a die, etc.) or continuous (temperature, wind speed, speech signals, etc). The problem is to determine a signal model to explain and characterize the occurrence of the observed symbols. If such a model exists, then you can use it to identify or recognize other observation sequences. Based on a signal and the dynamics of a system, one can decide the shape of the model and type of observation to study: deterministic or stochastic [34] .
Based on the above, we can attribute the following properties to Discrete and Continuous HMMs:
• Discrete HMM (DHMM). This HMM has a discrete alphabet, or set of symbols. Their values and observations are clearly defined, therefore in every state of the model, a discrete probability distribution function is defined. Each observed symbol X has a probability distribution given by the expression F(X ) = P(X = x).
• Continuous HMM (CHMM). In this type of HMM observable values are continuous; the size of the observation space is infinite. The alphabet is not a countable set, i. e., a set of possible observation values of a variable X covers a whole range of real numbers. Moreover, a CHMM uses continuous probability density functions (pdf ) in every state of the model. To calculate the continuous probability distribution for observation X, it uses the expression F (X) =
f (x)dx. Given that P (X = x) = 0, we need to integrate around its value (by a small value ) to obtain P (X ≈ x).
There is only one feature that makes a difference between a DHMM and a CHMM: matrix B (see next section). Every DHMM contains a finite set of symbols or alphabet, with a clearly defined probability distribution for each symbol or observed element. In contrast, a CHMM's alphabet is an uncountable set. That is, observed values that each symbol can take on cover an interval of real numbers, and therefore a continuous probability density function (pdf ) is used.
Univariate CHMMs
An important application of CHMMs is modeling Time Series (TS). TS are recorded observations of a particular process function along time. We can define a stochastic process as a family {X(t), t ∈ T } of random variables, driven by a parameter t, which varies in a range T.
In our study case for Univariate CHMMs (UCHMMs), we used a Normal Distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ (Eq. (2)) to calculate the probability of a sequence of observations. The form of the normal distribution is given in Eq. (2).
Each state of an UCHMM contains a normal probability distribution function.
Each state S j of an instance of this type of HMM, has a matrix B = b j,k , defined as follows:
where O is the observation sequence, N is the number of sates, and µ j and σ j represent the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of a normal distribution for state j.
To conclude, UCHMMs only take as reference a single observation symbol, in this case a real value at each time instant t. That is, the time series is a simple sequence of real values of one random variable.
Multivariate CHMMs
Multi interactions between discrete variables and continuous [37] .
An MCHMM observes a vector of variables, rather than a single variable (as in a univariate CHMM). The search space in a multivariate model becomes larger and more complex.
The most widely used probability distribution in the analysis of multivariate data is a Multivariate Normal Distribution (also known as Multivariate Gaussian Distribution). A multivariate normal distribution is a generalization of a onedimensional or univariate normal distribution to higher dimensions (Eq. (4)).
where Σ is a covariance matrix, |Σ| is the covariance matrix determinant, µ is a vector of mean values, x is a vector containing d values of observed variables. If |Σ| = 0, the vector x follows a degenerate distribution, i. e., there is no variability in some of its principal components. With a preliminary data analysis of the random variables, one could determine what variables might be susceptible to be removed. E.g., using principal component analysis [38] . If some random variables remain constant, then the study of the dynamics of the system can be based only on the variables that change over time.
In an HMM we use the probability distribution matrix B = b j,x to compute the probability of observing values x in state j, which is given by Eq. (5).
Note that to completely specify a multivariate normal distribution one needs to estimate the mean (µ) and covariance matrix (Σ) for each multigaussian pdf in each state of the MCHMM.
One disadvantage of using HMMs is the need for an a-priori notion of the model topology. That is, in order to build an HMM we must first decide how many states the model will contain and what transitions among states will be allowed. Once a model structure has been designed, the transition and emission parameters need to be estimated from training data.
Evolutionary Programming
An HMMs' parameters are determined during an iterative process called "training". One of the conventional methods applied in HMM training is the BaumWelch algorithm [4] ; Eventhough the Baum-Welch algorithm is the most common way to train an HMM, it suffers from converging to local optima. Genetic Algorithms (GA) and Evolutionary Programming (EP) are global optimization techniques that can be used to optimize the HMM parameters [3, 28, 41] .
These algorithms evolve a population of individuals subject to random actions, similar to those that act on biological evolution (mutation and genetic recombination). An important component of evolution is a selection criteria, in terms of which it decides what individuals are the fittest -those who survive-and which the least fit -which will be discarded- [39, 40, 42] .
Evolutionary Computation
In the mid 1880s Charles Darwin said "natural selection is the process by which the forms of organisms (in a population) that are best adapted to the environment increase in frequency relative to less well adapted forms over a number of generations".
Hence, evolution always coincides with adaptation as a process of progressive change of structures, which results in an improved behavior when an individual interacts with an environment.
To explain the performance of an evolutionary adaptive system, we define the following terms:
• Environment (E ): In which the system performs adaptation.
• Structures (S ): A finite set of structures with different phenotypical traits (i.e. a population).
• Operators (Ω): A finite set of operators for structure modification; where Ω = {ω : S m → S n } with m, n ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}. An operator ω maps m structures into a set of n possibly modified structures.
• Evaluation Function (µ E ): For each structure s ∈ S, the evaluation function returns a fitness value µ E (s).
• Adaptation algorithm (α): Determines how the structures in S are modified by the operators ω ∈ Ω with respect to the received environment signals.
Evolution, in the form of iterated selection and variation, is nature's main mechanism to adapt individuals to specific environment niches. Many systems can be modeled according to these definitions.
Evolutionary Programming (EP) treats mainly with the question of how to evolve computer programs, implemented as finite state machines, for prediction, control, and pattern classification tasks.
EP appears as an evolution of GA; it is more expressive than the bit strings of fixed length used by GA. EP is framed as one of the techniques within evolutionary computation, which allows a natural way to simulate the learning automata or programmable digital computer through the man-machine interaction. It has been used to generate programs and to solve mathematical formulae, electronic circuits, finite state machines, etc. [43, 44] . Since our goal is to evolve HMMs, we need a more general framework, where we can express individuals of different sizes and complexities under a general scheme. EP provides such a framework, where HMMs can be codified in non-homologous chromosomes of individuals that express the probabilistic automata that HMMs represent.
A Framework for Evolving an HMM
In this subsection we propose a framework for building and evolving an HMM's structure and parameters. The evolution process consists of:
• A population of chromosomes. One chromosome encodes the following information:
1. Size. Indicates the number of states of the HMM.
2. Transition Matrix. This gene contains the probability transitions among the states of the HMM. Eq. (6) shows matrix A.
where a i,j represents the probability of transitioning from state S i to state S j at time t + 1. That is, a i,j = P (q t+1 = S j |q t = S i ); for 
4. Covariance matrix array. The values of the mean and covariance matrices are used as input parameters in the multi-gaussian distributions defined in each state that forms the HMM. The mean and covariance matrices make up matrix B, used to compute the probability of observing a symbol in a given state. Eq. (8) shows the structure of this vector
where
At the moment, only the main diagonal of the matrix contains values of the variances of the observed variables. The covariance values of the variables are not covered in the evolution of chromosomes at the time of reporting this work.
5. Pi array. The last gene represents the probability of the HMM to start at state S i ; i.e., this gene represents the probability that the first observation has been generated in state
Chromosomes are an encoded form of a potential solution. Initially, a population is generated randomly and the fitness values of all chromosomes are evaluated by calculating the objective function (Eq. (11)),
where P (O|λ) [4] represents the probability that the observation sequence had been generated by model λ (Eq. (1)), α T (i) represents the sum of probabilities of the HMM to end in state S i at time T . Rabiner [4] defines a computation algorithm for α T (i).
Using the above representation and fitness function, the whole evolution process is accomplished as follows:
• After random initialization of a population, the Evolutionary Programming (EP) cycle begins. At the beginning of each generation, a mating pool is formed by selecting some chromosomes from the population. The mating pool is used as parents for evolutionary operations to generate the offspring.
Each offspring is a complete HMM, so the system calculates how good this model is with respect to the observation sequence. We compute the probability of the HMM to have produced the observed sequence, which is assigned as its fitness.
• At the end of the generation, some chromosomes will be replaced by an offspring, maintaining a population of constant size across generations, preserving the offspring and parents with the best fitnesses.
• This EP is setup to apply the following evolutionary operators: mutParameters (mutates the parameters of the mean and variance genes), mutTransition (mutates probability values on transitions among states), delTransition (deletes a state transition), addTransition (adds a new state transition), Copy (copies a complete chromosome), addNode (adds a new node to the model), and delNode (deletes a node from the model).
• The above process is repeated until the cycle reaches a maximum number of generations. By emulating a natural selection with evolutionary programming, this process will hopefully determine the best chromosomes of the highly optimized solutions to the problem. The HMM generated and optimized by EP is a great help to detect statistically anomalous behaviors; its function is to detect anomalous behavior and to discriminate over a normal one. HMMs focus on statistics-based anomaly detection techniques. The methodology proposed in this paper consists of building a statistics-based normal profile and employs statistical tests to determine whether observed activities deviate significantly from the normal model.
Anomaly Detection
Information security is complex; there is currently no system that covers all the requirements and needs at a hundred percent. The goal of any security system is to achieve protection against intrusion or anomaly behavior on a computer system [45] .
Proliferation of heterogeneous computer networks have serious implications
for the problem of detecting anomalies. The most important issue in this set of implications is an increased opportunity of an unauthorized access through network connectivity [46] .
Network security has become an extremely vital subject that requires development of accurate and efficient solutions capable of effectively protecting network systems and the invaluable information that transits on them. A network system plays a very critical role in a modern society and there exist sensitive data stored and handled through networks [47] .
Anomaly detection is performed by detecting changes in the patterns of resources utilization or system behavior. Anomaly detection may be performed by building a statistical model that contains metrics derived from system operation;
an anomaly detection system flags as intrusive any observed metrics that have a statistically significant deviation from the model [1] . In other words, an anomaly detection system uses a model of "normal" network behavior to compare to currently observed network behavior. Any behavior that varies from this model is considered a network anomaly and behaviors closely matching the model are considered as "normal". In general, a normal behavior of a computer system can be characterized by observing its properties over time.
The problem of detecting anomalies can be viewed as filtering non-permitted deviations of characteristic properties in the monitored network system [48] .
Anomaly detection can also be defined as a process of identifying malicious behavior that targets a network and its resources [46] .
Anomaly detection research is carried out in several application domains, such as monitoring business news, epidemic or bioterrorism detection, intrusion detection, hardware fault detection, network alarm monitoring, fraud detection, etc.
The anomaly detection problem involves large volumes of time series data, which has a significant number of entities and activities. The main goal of anomaly detection is to identify as many interesting and rare events as possible with minimum delay and a minimum number of false alarms [18] .
Anomaly Detection Methods
There are two general approaches used in intrusion detection in computer systems:
anomaly detection and signature recognition [18, 46] . These approaches used for intrusion detection have advantages and disadvantages in providing security to data and computer systems.
• Anomaly Detection is based on a normal behavior profile of the subject.
This profile is compared with the observed behavior of the subject, signaling an anomaly when the observed behavior differs significantly from the normal profile. That is, it is responsible for discovering changes in utilization patterns or unusual system behavior. the attacks for which they were trained; new attacks and even variants of common attacks are often overlooked (false negatives) [49] .
As computer networks grow in importance and size, they require effective monitoring of activities to prevent illegal access to resources, suspicious activities or patterns that suggest potentially hostile traffic. Due to recent attacks to information systems, this concern increases so we decided to work on it. In this research we use evolutionary computation to generate an HMM that models the normal behavior of a given system. This search process is performed using a population of individuals that are randomly generated and represent possible solutions to the problem of finding the best model that represents a given observation sequence. The model obtained through evolutionary computation, will represent the normal behavior of the system. Finally, the model will be used to analyze sequences of subsequent observations and determine whether there is an anomaly or not.
Results
This section presents the results of EvoHMM applied to several anomaly detection tasks. The system was tested using the produced HMMs to detect anomalies in synthetic data, measure their performance, and compare them against the HMMs trained using the Baum-Welch algorithm. Those experiments evolve uni-and multi-variable HMMs, which are compared against models developed by human experts. Finally, we produce an MCHMM capable to detect when network traffic that would be normal during a week day is observed during a weekend; this behavior was successfully flagged as anomalous.
The platform on which the system was developed and tested is an iMac, with the operating system MAC OSX version 10.9, an Intel processor with Core i7, at 2.3 GHz, and 4 Gb of RAM. The Software used in the development of algorithms and calculation of the probability distributions was Mathematica v9.0.
The software presented in this paper, EvoHMM, can be downloaded from http:
//dep.fie.umich.mx/~juan/Code/EvoHMM.
Test Observation Sequences
The network traffic used for the experiments was produced at the computing center at the Universidad Michoacana, using a tool called PRTG Traffic Grapher v6.2.2.984. The monitoring is carried out steadily, observing all subnets of all the university campuses, recording data every hour throughout the year.
The monitoring process produces data tables that contain the following fields:
Date, which records date and time, Traffic IN is the input network traffic, and traffic OUT is the output network traffic. The magnitude of these two last fields are expressed in Kilobits.
Univariate Observation Sequences
In experiments with UCHMMs, we used the time series produced by a continuous The inclusion of time as a state variable allows the system to detect anomalous behaviors in certain times that if observed at other times would be considered as normal.
In the observation sequence O, time (expressed using a day.hour format) and bandwidth were used as variables. With these observation sequences, MCHMMs with d = 2 were created and trained. Sequence O contains data from the network traffic for a full week, sampled every hour, accounting for a total of 168 data.
This observation sequence is defined as a multivariate test sequence, which has the following form:
Each observation in Eq. (12) 
The Anomaly Detection Process
The process of anomaly detection using HMMs, is done by analyzing observation subsequences of the system's variables. These subsequences will be called data sliding windows, or time windows. Time windows contain a contiguous subset of constant size (specified in each analysis of the test sequence). The data contained in the data series within each time window is analyzed independently. That is, it is sent to an HMM and the probability that the model produced that subsequence is computed. If that probability lies under a given threshold, the time window is considered anomalous.
The complete process is described in detail below:
• The input data to the system are the test time series O, the data window size w, the HMM model (λ), and a reference probability Threshold.
• The system begins to analyze the sliding data windows. Let us call W t the time window that starts at time t, i.e.,
window slides one time unit per iteration, until the last datum on the series is reached, computing the probability that corresponds to each window. This probability is given by Eq. (13):
• To detect if there is an anomaly in the current data window W t , just compare the probability value of the window with the reference Threshold. If the P (W t | λ) ≥ Threshold the observed data in that window is considered as normal; that is, the probability of the subsequence being generated by the model is acceptable. Otherwise, the system reports an anomaly in the data window.
• This procedure is applied to all windows that are defined for data analysis;
i.e., W t , 1 ≤ t ≤ T −w +1, where T = |O|, the length of the test observation sequence.
This is how the system performs the analysis of test data, which helps to determine probabilistically, whether or not a data sequence presents anomalies. This process is general, for both univariate and multivariate observations sequences.
For example, for the univariate example of Figure 2 , the probabilities generated by applying the HMM to the sliding time window were compared to a probability Threshold to determine if there was an anomaly. Figure 4 shows the results.
One could think an HMM would do better by presenting more information to it. Unfortunately, the total probability P (W t | λ) is computed as products of the partial probabilities of transitioning from state to state and the probabilities of a given state to produce the observed information. If the time windows are very Setting the value of Threshold is arbitrary; it is normally set according to the range of probabilities of the sequence data with which HMMs were trained. When defining the threshold value we must be careful to set an appropriate value. If we set Threshold = 1, all probability values of the data sequences lie under Threshold and their respective time windows are considered as anomalies (False Positives).
If the value of Threshold = 0, then all the probabilities are above yield Threshold and their respective time windows are considered normal (False Negatives). In the anomaly detection process, the threshold is the only parameter that requires knowledge or experience of the user. The threshold value shown in Figure 4 was defined at 1.0 × 10 −9 .
Comparison of Models trained with EP and Baum-Welch
In this subsection we compare HMM models produced using Evolutionary Programming against models trained with the Baum-Welch algorithm.
To produce a semi-stochastic model with n states to be trained with the Baum-Welch algorithm, we divided the observation time series in n parts using a clustering algorithm. The idea is that states of the system with similar values for their variables will be represented by the same state. For each cluster, we computed its mean and standard deviation, which were used as the parameters that define the emission probability at its corresponding state. The transition probabilities between each pair of states were generated randomly, making sure they abided by the probability axioms.
Both approaches to produce HMMs are stochastic. Under those conditions, to assert any properties of the produced models, we need to replicate the experiment a number of independent executions and statistically prove their properties. With that in mind, we decided to execute every experiment 30 times in order to perform statistical comparisons between the models produced by EP and the Baum-Welch algorithm. Those comparisons were performed by a hypothesis test for equality of means. If we could reject the hypothesis that means are equal, then we have statistical evidence that one model behaves better than the other one.
EvoHMM, as described in section 5, was applied to the univariate time series to produce HMMs to later be used in anomaly detection. For the univariate case, EP was applied to a population of 250 individuals, generating 125 offspring at every generation; the population was evolved for 250 generations. The process produced HMMs of different sizes, containing from 3 to 8 states.
For the case of univariate models, the resulting mean µ and variance σ, for Evolutionary Programming (EP) and Baum-Welch (BW) are shown in Table 1 .
Remember that larger values of the fitness function P (O|λ), represent a higher probability of the observation sequence O to be generated by the model λ. According to the results in Table 1 , on average, the fitness functions for
HMMs produced by EP are 31 orders of magnitude greater than those trained with BW. This means better performance for HMMs trained with EP than those with BW. However, to verify that the means of both models are significantly different, we performed a hypothesis test. The hypothesis test was conducted for the thirty models trained with EP and BW, assuming that the logarithm of P (O|λ)
is normally distributed. We use a logarithm transformation because it keeps a relationship with the order of magnitude of each probability. The hypothesis test concludes that the means are different at a level of significance α = 0.05 and therefore the orders of magnitude are different.
Once a model was produced (by any of the two approaches), it is deployed to perform anomaly detection. An anomalous observation sequence, O a , was used as a test series and the produced HMMs are used to analyze this sequence trying to find anomalies. Synthetic data was inserted in the sequence to simulate an anomaly. Table 2 shows the results of anomaly detection for the thirty HMMs For the models that include two variables: the bandwidth and time, we proceed similarly to the previous experiment. Thirty HMMs were trained using EP and BW and the results of the mean and standard deviation of their fitnesses are shown in Table 3 . Note that the mean of the fitness function for HMMs produced with EP is 127 orders of magnitude greater than the mean of HMMs produced using BW. 
Comparison of an Evolutionary Model and a Model Developed by an Expert
This section presents an experiment designed to compare the operation and performance of an HMM evolved with EP against another HMM designed based on the behavior analysis of the data and experience of a researcher. The HMM designed with a priori knowledge then was used in the detection of anomalous sequences in the load of a processor in a mail server [52] .
The model used for this comparison, was the HMM with 6 states designed in the thesis entitled "Deteccion de Anomalias en la Carga de un Procesador, utilizando Modelos Ocultos de Markov" 2 [52] . The HMM presented in Navarrete's thesis, was developed by hand and trained with data values corresponding to the load average of a mail server installed at FIRA 3 . The measurements were obtained at intervals of 15 minutes, giving an observation sequence of 96 data entries. Figure 5 presents the normal and anomalous behaviors for five cases.
To produce the anomalous behaviors, random values were inserted (synthetic data representing an increase in processor load on the mail server). The original sequence is represented by the solid line, and the synthetic data by the dotted line. Figure 5 presents the simulation of the following kinds of attacks:
• Sub-figure a) shows a type A attack. This type of attack provides increments no more than 30%, during the phase of lower load of the server. It represents an intruder trying to hide during a low server load period.
• Sub-figure b) represents a type B attack, which represents an increase of 10% during the phase of higher load of the mail server. This attack may be one that tries to hide during the time that the server has the greatest burden. The attack intended to go unnoticed, so the load was not increased much, at moments where the server already has a high workload.
• Sub-figure c), a type C attack is an increase between 50% and 60% during the phase of lower workload of the server. In this attack the intruder does 2 Anomaly Detection in Processor Load using Hidden Markov Models 3 FIRA, -acronym from spanish for "Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura" -is a financial government institution dedicated to provide funding to agricultural-related investment project Figure 5 . Examples of Informatics Attacks not try to hide. The scenario showed a remarkable increase in the processor load; the intruder tries to exploit the lowest workload phase, when the server is less monitored (perhaps during work breaks or non-working hours).
• Sub-figure d) shows a type D attack, which represents an increase of 60% in the server load during the phase of peak workload. The intruder does not try to hide; the scenario showed a remarkable increase in the processor load. This attack could be aimed to reduce (or even impede) the service of the server (Denial of Service attack type), lasting for more workload processor cycles.
• Sub-figure e) represents a type E attack, which consists of an increase between 10% and 30% of the server load during the phase of least work. This situation may represent a possible threat to attack the server. The attacker maintains a low profile, since it does not significantly increase the workload; the attack occurs during a time period of no activity (a nonworking day).
The results reported by Navarrete in anomaly detection state that for types C and D attacks, their HMM had no problem detecting the variation in the behavior of processor load. Besides, his model was not able to detect variations in the probability of cases A, B, and E. Despite his claims, we observed different results, which are described next.
In order to compare the models produced by EvoHMM with the model handcrafted by the expert, we run 30 experiments and selected the best model. Table 5 shows the results of this comparison for the five anomalous cases (first column). Given that the results of the expert are deterministic, we cannot perform a hypothesis test. Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate a superior performance of the evolved models, compared with those produced by an expert. To asses the performance of anomaly detection for univariate data against the detection of multivariate data, we compare the best models of each case. The test tries to determine which model is better at detecting anomalous behavior data in the given sequence. The test set swaps Saturday and Monday day data (see Figure 3) .
To give the model the notion of time and be able to recognize normal traffic on a weekday, and detect a weekday traffic as anomalous if it occurs in a weekend or holiday, we included time as a variable in the models. One caveat is that the time variable does not follow a normal distribution. The assertion of time not being normally distributed was verified by applying the Anderson-Darling test [53] . However, supported by the central limit theorem, if we have a sample of more than 30 data, the error incurred when using the normal distribution is minimum [53] . This assumption was supported by a strong performance in the anomaly detection by introducing a normal weekday traffic in a non-working day.
The experiment was developed using data windows of size 6. The probabilities generated with the sliding time window and the respective HMMs, were compared with the threshold value to determine whether there was or not any anomaly. Table 6 presents the percentages of Hits, False Positives (false alarms), and False Negatives (unrecognized anomalies) for both models. Observing Table 6 we note that UCHMM, trained with the variable network bandwidth consumption alone, was not able to detect the data exchanged on On the other hand, the MCHMM was able to detect the data swap between
Monday and Saturday in the sequence O ma . In all windows an anomalous behavior was identified when it existed, although to different degrees of certainty.
Conclusions And Future Work
Nowadays, protecting a network completely from attacks is a very hard task; even heavily protected networks are sometimes penetrated. In this document, we outlined a framework for evolving HMMs used for anomaly detection. These models generated and optimized by Evolutionary Programming, provide detection capabilities for anomalous behaviors. HMMs are capable of distinguishing between normal and abnormal behaviors. Our experiments show that Hidden Markov Models do well, detecting about 83% of the anomalies presented in a time series. All models were produced by means of EP, without the need of human intervention at all. The EP determines the size of the HMM, the probability distributions on each state, and the transition probabilities among pairs of states.
From these experiments we arrived to the following conclusions about the Baum-Welch (BW) algorithm: although it is a good learning method using time series data, it generally converges to a local optimum. Another problem that this algorithm presents, is that users need previous background knowledge about HMM theory and how to build the models. The BW algorithm's performance depends a lot on a good set of initial parameters to be refined. That is, if we give it bad starting parameters, the method may not converge. We also realize that it needs for its proper usage an initial HMM design (i.e., the number of states and transitions among them), a probability distribution function for each state, an initial starting point (an estimate for transition and starting point probabilities);
all of these components are provided based on the user's expertise.
Regarding our results, we observed the following points about HMMs produced using EP: EP does not assume the user to possess any background knowledge about statistical models; it automatically creates and optimizes an HMM based solely on the time series data. All this method needs is a time series, the fitness function (Eq. (11)), and time for processing meta-heuristic that finds the best model.
The performance of HMMs produced with EvoHMM was empirically shown to outperform the performance of similar models trained with the BW algorithm.
These results were validated using statistical procedures that reject the hypothesis that both models are comparable.
We compared an MCHMM against a UCHMM, both models were evolved using EP. These models were used in anomaly detection in an observation sequence.
The result of the test was the the MCHMM model had better performance than the UCHMM model. The MCHMM was able to detect in all data windows a pattern or anomalous behavior, although to different degree of certainty. The reader may think that this is an obvious conclusion: by providing more information, the resulting model has to perform better. Nevertheless, we have the curse of dimensionality and need to be careful as to how much information we provide to the models, or to the meta-heuristic that searches for the best model; too much information makes the search space grow too much, causing the meta-heuristic not to find a good model at all.
In comparing an evolved model against a model developed by an expert, the experiments report that the evolved model detects some attack types better than the model developed by the expert, detecting variations in the behavior of the processor load in the mail host server. The anomaly detection system uses sliding windows, taking subsequences of the original observation sequence. Additionally, it uses also a threshold value involved in the detection of probabilities variations.
These two elements involved in the anomaly detection made possible to detect variation of probability that the model developed by the expert could not.
Forthcoming experiments include using parallelizing the design and evolutionary process. We hope in the near future, to compare our method with some others, like the one used by Warrender et al. [25] and determine how well our system behaves with respect to theirs.
Our work on HMMs is centered around the task of anomaly detection in network bandwidth usage. The models we described in this paper are built from time series data of this variable measured at our University. We expect our computer center to use this detection tools in the near future.
We believe the results presented in this paper contribute to the development of more accurate models for anomaly detection.
